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logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc-
turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. 
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of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori.   
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1. Introduction.  
Thomas S. Kuhn was one of the most important intellectual figures of the second half of 
the 20th century. His opus magnum The Structure of Scientific Revolutions turned 
concepts such as “paradigm”, “incommensurability”, and “scientific revolution” into 
household words. Although Structure is not particularly difficult to read, it has proved a 
difficult and immensely controversial book to interpret. The aim of our contribution is 
not to add another interpretation to the many existing ones, at least not directly. Rather, 
we want to discuss three interesting appropriations of Kuhn’s ideas that have been 
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brought forward in philosophy of science, and discuss why they failed, or at least, what 
are the difficulties they have been confronted with. 
The outline of our paper is as follows: in the next section we will deal with the early 
reception of Kuhn’s ideas by the late logical empiricism of the 1960s and 1970s. 
General wisdom has it that Kuhn’s work provided the last nail in the coffin of the 
already moribund logical positivist philosophy of science. Actually, things were more 
complicated. As Reisch, Grünberg and Irzig, and other scholars have shown that   the 
relation between classical logical empiricism and historicist approaches such as Kuhn’s 
was more complex than the simplistic story according to which Kuhn (or Feyerabend or 
Popper or somebody else) “killed” Logical positivism (cf. Creath 1995). Indeed, Carnap 
“very much liked” Structure and played an active role in publishing it as the penultimate 
volume of the series Foundations of the Unity of Science. This series was the 
introductory part of The Encyclopedia of Unified Science that might be considered as 
the official platform of the logical empiricist movement. 
The works of Hempel, Frank, and Neurath provide other evidence that the relation 
between logical empiricist philosophy of science and Kuhn’s historicist approach cannot 
be described simply as a neat and clear-cut opposition. Hempel, for instance, fully in 
line with Kuhn, insisted that an adequate methodological theory must be informed by a 
close study of the history, sociology, and psychology of actual scientific research 
behavior. That Neurath subscribed to a picture of science, in which the role of science in 
politics and society played a pre-eminent role is hardly new. Similarly, as will be 
explained in some more detail later, Frank was a partisan of an engaged philosophy of 
science that emphasized the importance of the social and political aspects of the 
scientific entreprise. Thus, the real difficulty with the logical empiricist theory of 
science was not that it had no place for the non-logical aspects of science but that it did 
not manage to bring the logical and the extra-logical aspects of science together in a 
way that appealed to the general philosophical public. How the logical and the historical 
aspects of science studies matched in a logical-empiricist framework, however, was 
never sufficiently clarified. The logical empiricists failed to convince the general reader 
that their approach did justice to the logical and the social and historical aspects of 
science. As we want to show in the following, this shortcoming became clearly visible 
in the confrontation of late logical empiricism and Kuhn’s “revolutionary” historical 
philosophy of science that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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As our second example we will consider in section 3 a curious attempt to come to terms 
with the challenge which Kuhn’s ideas presented to traditional philosophy of science, to 
wit, the attempt of Stegmüller and his school to reconstruct the basic concepts of 
Kuhn’s conceptual apparatus in a purely formal manner. Thereby they hoped to enlarge 
the conceptual arsenal of formal philosophy, and aiming at a “combined theory of the 
dynamics of theories” that was formally precise and socio-historically founded. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Kuhn endorsed this attempt of formalizing his ideas – at least 
for some time.  
As our third example we will consider in section 4 Friedman’s attempt to apply Kuhnian 
ideas to formulate an historically enlightened modernized Kantian philosophy of science 
that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive moving a priori. As has been 
pointed out by several authors, there are Kantian and neo-Kantian features in Kuhn’s 
thought. Late in his career, Kuhn himself cryptically characterized his approach “as a 
sort of post-Darwinian Kantianism” (Kuhn 1991, 12). On the other hand, scholars of 
history of philosophy of science have been engaged in excavating traces of a Neo-
kantian legacy in Carnap’s philosophy of science. Hence, it might not be too surprising 
that Carnap, Kuhn, and Kant have more in common than meets the eye.   
The appropriations of Kuhn’s ideas by late logical empiricism and structuralism, are 
historically naïve in the sense that they took the event “Kuhn” as something that just 
had happened and to which they had to react in some way or other: late logical 
empiricism bet on a peaceful coexistence between the received logically oriented 
philosophy of science, while the structuralists attempted to provide a “rational 
reconstruction” of Kuhn’s socio-historical approach.  
As time went on and Structure became a classic of the “new” historically oriented 
philosophy of science, the “Kuhnian revolution” itself became the study object of 
history of philosophy of science. In this vein, Coffa embedded the accounts of Kuhn 
and Carnap into a “semantic” tradition whose roots he traced back to Kant: 
  
Wittgenstein’s domain of showing, his later grammar, Carnap’s syntax, Sellars’s 
categorial frameworks, and Kuhn’s paradigms are some well-known members of 
the continuing series of attempts to find the right way of looking at that peculiar 
kind of knowledge that seems necessary and not vacuous, yet at the same time does 
not state any factual claim. Poincaré may have officially started the search when he 
observed that geometric axioms present themselves “in disguise”, pretending to be 
claims but really being something else; … by calling them definitions, he clearly 
intended to assign to them a role in the determination of meaning. (Coffa 1991, 
138).  
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Going further in this direction, Friedman argued that Kuhn’s historicism might be used 
for the formulation of a modernized (neo)kantian philosophy of science based on the 
concept of a historically moving non-apodictic constitutive a priori (Friedman 2003). 
In his beginnings, Kuhn himself was not very much interested in elucidating his place in 
history of philosophy. Although he was prepared to acknowledge some precursors such 
as Ludwik Fleck or Alexandre Koyré, he did not care much to conceive himself as 
member of some philosophical tradition. Only later he came to acknowledge the 
positive role of philosophy for the growing insight into the importance of historical 
considerations in philosophy of science:  
 
The concept of historical reconstruction that underlies The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions ... is by no means original: I owe it primarily to Alexandre Koyré; its 
ultimate sources lie in Neokantian philosophy (Kuhn, 1987, 361).   
 
Although Kuhn mentions Lange and Cassirer as Neokantian sources of his work  it 
remains unclear, what he really understood by “Neokantianism” since he subsumed 
under this heading authors such as Brunschvicg and Meyerson who can be characterized 
as Neokantians only by stretching this category considerably (cf. Friedman 2003, 29). 
As we will argue in some detail later, calling Kuhn a Neokantian is rather ambiguous. 
Be this as it may, Kuhn and Neokantians such as Cassirer shared  the conviction that 
history played a crucial role for a philosophical understanding of science. Hence, Kuhn 
was not the first to have pleaded for such a role for history of science, but certainly his 
plea has made the most impression in the second half of 20th century.  
In section 5 we deal with Kuhn’s legacy in the history of philosophy of science in the 
last decades of the 20th century. Recently, Hardcastle and Richardson gave Kuhn’s 
appeal for a role for history a new twist to overcome the present stagnation of 
philosophy of science. According to them, philosophy of science, after more than forty 
years after Structure was published, has reached a phase of stagnation and degeneration. 
In order to overcome this impass  they propose to adapt Kuhn’s famous principle to 
philosophy of science in the following way:  
 
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could pro-
duce a decisive transformation in the image of philosophy of science by which we 
now are possessed. (Hardcastle and Richardson 2003, vii, Kuhn 1962, 1).  
 
In other words, they propose to tap the sources of history of philosophy of science to 
overcome the deadlock in which they see philosophy of science presently trapped. More 
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precisely, they propose to revisit the social and political commitment of the original 
logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle hoping that this might lead to a rejuvenation of 
contemporary post-Kuhnian philosophy of science.  
In this way, Kuhn’s legacy may influence in an indirect way not only our picture of 
science but also that of philosophy of science, and more generally, that of philosophy as 
a whole. Of course, it is no news at all, that the history of philosophy is an important 
ingredient for philosophy itself, but it is somewhat ironic that philosophy of science, as 
the allegedly on scientific part of philosophy that is left after all non-scientific 
metaphysical influences have been eliminated, turned out to depend on its history as 
well.   
Before we start with the real thing let us note that not everybody considered Kuhn’s 
work as something worth of being appropriated in some way or other. For some, Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science is a real threat for occidental science and rationality as a whole. A 
particular wild example of this stance is provided by Scheffler’s early criticism of 
Structure:   
 
The current attacks (of Kuhn, A.I. and T.M.) challenge the very opposition 
between science and speculative idealism, from which scientifically minded philo-
sophies have sprung. The attacks threaten further the underlying moral motivation 
of these philosophies, their upholding of the ideal of responsibility in the sphere of 
belief as against willfullness, authoritarianism, and inertia. The issues are 
fundamental, indeed more fundamental than is generally realized, precisely 
because a powerful moral vision has implicitly been called into question. (Scheffler 
1967, 7 – 8). 
 
Over the years the number of such fervent anti-Kuhnian eruptions has somewhat dimi-
nished, but still today there are some who assess Kuhn’s “achievements” in a quite 
similar way as Scheffler did; see for instance Fuller’s anti-Kuhnian treatises Thomas 
Kuhn. A Philosophical History for Our Time (Fuller 2000) and Kuhn vs. Popper. The 
Struggle for the Soul of Science (Fuller 2004) where Kuhn, among other niceties, is 
accused of jeopardizing rational choice in science, crippling critical discourse in and 
about science, advocating “Big science” against “citizen science” etc. In a less shrill 
voice this is echoed by neo-Popperians such as Gattei who rehearses Scheffler’s 
polemics from some forty years ago accusing Kuhn that his philosophy 
 
drastically impoverishes the reasons, aim, and scope of philosophical critique. 
Confrontation is often banned, criticism discouraged. Philosophical and scientific 
values of truth and rationality are replaced with commitment to the dominant 
tradition and consensus within a community of experts. (Gattei 2008, 135). 
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In contrast, in the present paper we take a broadly positive attitude towards Kuhn’s 
work in that we believe that his philosophical ideas should be considered as fruitful for 
philosophy of science and related disciplines. Kuhn has the undisputable merit of 
havingvigorously  reminded philosophy once again of the indispensable role of history 
for understanding science. In this endeavour he was not the first and perhaps his 
philosophical understanding of history was not the most sophisticated one, but the 
impact of his ideas on 20th century philosophy of science was certainly greater than that 
of anybody else.   
 
 
2. Logical Empiricism.  
One might think that the logical empiricists of the 1960s and 1970s did not find much in 
Kuhn’s work that deserved to be appropriated in some way or other. Rather, they would 
regard Kuhn as the “arch-enemy” of any kind of logical and rational epistemology and 
philosophy of science. A good example for this sometimes almost hysterical reaction to 
Kuhn as a dangerous “irrationalist” is Scheffler’s already mentioned contention that 
Kuhn’s picture of science was that of an irresponsible idealist that intended to level out 
any difference between rational science and arbitrary speculation. This reaction was not, 
however, that of the leading figures of late logical positivism or empiricism such as 
Carnap, Hempel or Feigl - quite the contrary. They were at pains to see the relation 
between the logical-empiricist and Kuhn’s socio-historically oriented perspective on 
science as a relation of peaceful co-existence and mutually fruitful division of labour 
and collaboration.   
In the beginning, everything worked smoothly between Kuhn and the logical-empiricist 
establishment, in particular with Carnap. As Reisch has pointed out some years ago, 
Structure was originally commissioned as a monograph for the series Foundations of 
the Unity of Science (cf. Reisch 1991). This was a collection issued to introduce the 
famous International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, originally the brain-child of 
Neurath and, after his death in 1945, edited by Carnap and Morris. On the occasion of 
publishing Structure Carnap as editor wrote some letters to Kuhn, from which we quote 
the relevant passages: 
 
Thank you very much for sending me your manuscripts. … I believe that the 
planned monograph will be a valuable contribution to the Encyclopedia. I am 
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myself very much interested in the problems, which you intend to deal with, even 
though my knowledge of the history of science is rather fragmentary. Among many 
other items I liked your emphasis on the new conceptual frameworks which are 
proposed in revolutions in science, and, on their basis, the posing of new questions, 
not only answers to old problems. … 
I am convinced that your ideas will be very stimulating for all those who are inter-
ested in the nature of scientific theories and especially the causes and forms of their 
changes. (after Reisch 1991, 266, 267).  
 
There is no evidence that Carnap was not serious in his assessment. On the contrary: in 
private communication with Morris he characterized Structure “as a really fine piece of 
work”. Carnap did not understand Structure as the death-knell for logical empiricism. 
Whether he was right or wrong in this is a matter of dispute, but certainly he did not 
predict the impact that Structure was to have on the intellectual landscape of late 20th 
century philosophy of science and beyond.  
Indeed, it is not difficult to see why Carnap might have considered Kuhn’s approach as 
congenial to his own. Due to the work of Reisch, Grünberg and Irzik, Earman and many 
others one may even set up a kind of dictionary between Carnap and Kuhn. Carnap’s 
linguistic frameworks correspond to Kuhn’s paradigms, and Kuhn’s “normal science” 
which he described as puzzle-solving in a given paradigmatic framework has its 
counterpart in Carnap’s concept of answering question or proving theorems inside a 
given linguistic framework. Finally, the replacement of one linguistic or ontological 
framework by another one corresponds to a scientific revolution in which one paradigm 
is substituted by another one. To put it in a nutshell, Kuhn’s approach based on the 
notion of paradigm may be considered as an informal version of Carnap’s, or, to put it 
the other way round, Carnap’s linguistic frameworks may be seen a logicized counter-
parts of Kuhn’s paradigms.  
These analogies evidence that Carnap’s positive reaction toward Structure and its 
publication in the Foundations of Encyclopedia of Unified Science was founded in some 
general assumptions of his philosophical perspective. For him, Kuhn’s socio-historical 
perspective on science complemented the (better known) logical approach of logical 
empiricism. Already in 1934, when the logical empiricist movement had reached its 
peak in Vienna, Carnap had recognised as perfectly legitimate, “in addition to the logic 
of science ... also the empirical investigation of scientific activity, such as historical, 
sociological, and, above all, psychological inquiries.” (Carnap 1934 (1937), 279). As 
Carnap pointed out, both kinds of investigations may be grouped together under the 
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heading “theory of science”. Some years later, in the Encyclopedia, we find the follo-
wing extension of this brief remark: 
 
The task of science may be approached from various angles. ... We may, for 
instance, think of an investigation of scientific activity. ... [The] investigations of 
scientific activity may be called history, psychology, sociology, and methodology 
of science. The subject matter of such studies is science as a body of actions carried 
out by certain persons under certain circumstances. Theory of science in this sense 
will be dealt with at various other places in the Encylopedia; it is certainly an 
essential part of the foundation of science. (Carnap 1938, 42 – 43). 
 
Thus, strictly speaking, it is not correct to accuse the logical empiricists as being 
obsessed by an overly narrow, purely logical perspective on science. Of course, Carnap, 
for his part, worked only on the logic of science, since 
  
unfortunately a division of labor is necessary, and therefore I am compelled to 
leave the detailed work in this direction to philosophically interested sociologists 
and sociologically trained philosophers. (Carnap 1963, 868).  
 
In other words, contrary to general wisdom, Carnap’s philosophy of science cannot be 
characterized bluntly as one that admitted only the logical way as the legitimate way of 
doing theory of science; for him, theory of science had much greater spectrum, 
comprising the various kinds of empirical science studies as well. Whether Carnap’s 
pluralist conception of a comprehensive theory of science was actually viable, is, of 
course, a quite different question. Recently Thomas Uebel dubbed Carnap’s envisaged 
bipartite approach, which, according to him, was also favoured by Frank and Neurath, 
the “bipartite metatheory” of the Vienna Circle’s logical empiricism. The bipartite 
metatheory was designed to be the successor discipline of traditional metaphysically 
contaminated epistemology and philosophy of science.  This „bipartite metatheory“ was 
said to have two components:  
 
      (1)  a logical component in the sense of a Carnapian logic of science; 
 
(2) an empirical part roughly in the sense of Neurath’s „behavioristics of scholars“  
or Frank’s „pragmatics of science“.  
 
Uebel argues that this bipartite theory should be considered as the common legacy of 
the three great figures of the Vienna Circle, to wit, Carnap, Neurath, and Frank. Indeed, 
it is not  difficult to find in Neurath’s work a strong commitment to the social, political, 
and historical aspects of science (see for instance Nemeth 2007). In a similar vein, one 
can find in Frank’s Modern Science and Its Philosophy (Frank 1949) an explicit call 
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upon logical empiricists to engage in the task of formulating a comprehensive 
philosophy of science that takes into account logical and historical aspects of science:    
 
We have to complement our logico-empirical analysis – where “empirical” implies 
individual experiences – by “historical analysis”, which is empirical not for the 
individual but for the human race. The history of science is the workshop of the 
philosophy of science. We have to teach the student all the relevant principles that 
have been set up in the course of history.  … In this way the logico-empirical 
analysis gains life and color and becomes a living link between science and the 
evolution of the human race. (Frank 1949, 278). 
  
Despite this and similar announcements, after WWII neither Carnap nor Frank  made 
greater efforts to make visible the allegedly comprehensive nature of logical empiricist 
of philosophy of science to a general philosophical public. Scientists, historians or 
philosophers, who did not belong to the logical empiricism’s inner circle, simply were 
not aware of the existence of the „bipartite metatheory“ that was to comprise logic and 
pragmatic of science. To put it bluntly, people who were engaged in coming to terms 
with Carnap’s logical and mathematical subtleties in inductive logic, say, did not 
interpret them as only one half of the story that logical empiricism had to tell about 
science. This situation for logical empiricism was aggravated by the fact that after the 
war, due to his death in 1945, Neurath’s workdisappeared from the radar of the general 
public almost completely, and, for several reasons not to be discussed here, Frank’s star 
was fading since the late 1950s (cf. Reisch 2005). Thus the mere coexistence of a strong 
logical component and a much lesser impressive component that dealt with non-logical 
aspects of science together with the abstract thesis that logic of science and pragmatics 
of science did complement each other, hardly justified the thesis that there was a logico-
empiricist theory that comprised the logic and pragmatics as two parts. After all, a 
theory should have a certain amount of unity, which the bipartite metatheory clearly was 
lacking. The two halves of the envisaged bipartite theory neither shared a common 
methodology nor a common object. 
Carnap might have been aware of this problematic situation. He might have hoped to 
use Kuhn’s work as a substitute for the underdeveloped non-logical half of the bipartite 
theory that he himself could not take care of, and whose realization had been neglected 
also by his fellow empiricists. Evidently, Structure had more appeal to a general public 
than the obscure work of an elderly European professor of physics such as Frank, who, 
after all, was not an expert in matters of history of science. From this point of view, 
Carnap’s positive attitude to Kuhn’s work may be interpreted neither as mere politeness 
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nor as a blunt misunderstanding but as a clever move to mobilize some fresh forces 
from outside for a relaunch of a rejuvenated comprehensive logico-empiricist philo-
sophy of science. If this manoeuvre had worked, it would have resulted in a peaceful 
and harmonious collaboration based on a neat division of labour between the two 
branches of a comprehensive theory of science, to wit, philosophy of science alias logic 
of science, and the ensemble of empirical studies of science such as history of science, 
sociology of science, psychology of science and possibly other disciplines.  
This project turned out to be a complete failure: Instead of leading to a balanced com-
prehensive logico-empiricist theory of science, the traditional logic-oriented philosophy 
of science soon was considered as obsolete, and for the general public logical 
empiricism was dead as a dodo.  
In the following decades, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was interpreted in 
innumerable ways, but certainly never as belonging to the Foundations part of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Although Kuhn’s opus magnum became 
the greatest bestseller in philosophy of science ever, it was never seen as an integral part 
of the logico-empiricist Encyclopedia. In particular, it never threw any light on the other 
parts of the Foundations which remained in the darkness. Indeed, it seems fair to say 
that most other contributions to the Foundations left no trace at all - neither inside nor 
outside the camp of logical empiricists.   
This fact should cause a certain discontent among the partisans of an alleged “alliance” 
between Kuhn and Carnap. The philosophical masses did not consider the historical 
approach of Structure as compatible with, to say nothing of being an integral part of, 
logical empiricist philosophy of science. Even Carnap himself, in his later writings after 
the publication of Structure in 1962, never mentioned Structure – not even in his semi-
popular non-technical Philosophical Foundations of Physics (Carnap 1966) where men-
tioning Structure would have been quite appropriate  - if one considers Structure as 
relevant for philosophy at all. Apparently, Carnap did not. For him, Structure remained 
a “nice piece” of history of science. 
This fact has been seldom noticed in the growing literature on the alleged similarity or 
alliance between the views of Carnap and Kuhn. An exception is the recent paper of 
Pinto de Oliveira (Pinto de Oliveira 2007). He considers as the cause of this omission 
Carnap’s strict separation between history of science and philosophy of science: 
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Carnap certainly considered Structure as a (nice) work in the history of science … 
for which, as such, the Encyclopedia had already reserved space in advance. This 
would explain, at the same time, the warm reception of Kuhn’s book in the letters 
and Carnap’s total neglect of it in his works in philosophy of science. (Pinto de 
Oliveira 2007, 155). 
 
According to Pinto de Oliveira, this somewhat schizophrenic reaction to Structure can 
be explained by the fact that Carnap strictly distinguished between history of science 
and logic of science due to his adherence to the strict distinction between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification. In other words, for him, logic of science and 
pragmatics of science are two different worlds that do not influence each other. The “bi-
partite metatheory” was nothing but a formal iuxtaposition of two  unrelated com-
ponents.  
Frank’s problems with the bipartite metatheory point in the opposite direction. In his 
work there is virtually no trace of the other component of the bipartite metatheory, to 
wit, logic of science in Carnap’s sense, except some laudatory remarks that do no 
argumentative work at all. For a general public, in search of a comprehensive picture of 
science, this was not a very appealing standpoint: in Carnap’s work there was little or 
nothing that could be interpreted as being even remotely related with the historical, 
sociological, or psychological aspects of science; in Neurath’s and Frank’s works, on 
the other hand, the reader found something to quench his thirst for historical, 
sociological and political aspects of science, information about historical, but not much 
dealing with the role of logic in science. In Frank’s Modern Science and its Philosophy 
(Frank 1949b) which one may consider as his philosophical summa, there is hardly any 
trace of a sophisticated logical perspective on science. The standard explanation for this 
omission is that books like Frank’s were written for a general public, and logic was not 
an appropiate topic for such an audience. Even if one admits that pursuing the bipartite 
strategy had made sense under certain circumstances, in the 1960s it had, as we shall see 
in more detail in section 5, fatal consequences for logical empiricism. 
 
 
3. Structuralism.  
As Scheffler’s furious assault showed not all philosophers of science shared Carnap’s 
conciliatory stance toward the new historical currents in philosophy of science. A case 
in question was the Austrian-German philosopher Wolfgang Stegmüller and his school. 
Stegmüller construed the event “Kuhn” as a dramatic shock for the community of 
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philosophers of science. According to him, Kuhn’s idea of science filled most 
philosophers of science with “speechless horror” (Stegmüller 1974, 167).  But, 
according to Stegmüller, the situation was not completely hopeless. Sneed’s novel 
“structuralist conception of theories” was the appropriate framework to overcome the 
apparent schism between logical or formal accounts of science and socio-historical ones 
such as Kuhn’s. According to Stegmüller, Kuhn was right in almost all points, 
nevertheless one needed not fear that science fall prey to irrationalism. Rather, among 
the many virtues of the structuralist metatheory - inaugurated by Sneed and further 
developed by the Stegmüller school – was the capacity to provide philosophy of science 
with the conceptual means for a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s socio-historical 
approach. In other words, the structuralist philosophy of science offered a 
comprehensive synthesis of the formal and the socio-historical perspectives on science. 
For some time, Kuhn himself was impressed by the structuralist appropriation of his 
ideas. In 1976 he confidently asserted: 
 
First, though still at an early stage of its development, the new formalism makes 
important new territory accessible to analytic philosophy of science. Second, 
though sketched with a pen I can still scarcely hold, preliminary charts of the new 
terrain display remarkable resemblance to a map I had previously sketched from 
scattered travellers’ reports brought back by itinerant historians of science. 
….. 
If only simpler and more palatable ways of representing the essentials of Sneed’s 
position can be found, philosophers, practitioners, and historians of science may, 
for the first time in years, find fruitful channels for interdisciplinary communi-
cations. (Kuhn 1976, 179, 181). 
 
Later, Kuhn’s enthusiasm for the new formal apparatus faded. In any case, his  hope that 
the structuralist jargon might become something like a lingua franca for scientists, phi-
losophers and historians in the trading zone between science, philosophy, and history, 
never came true .  .   
The basic conceptual tools for the structuralists’s appropriation of Kuhn were their 
novel set-theoretical or model-theoretical concepts of “theory”, “theory-nets”, “holding 
a theory”, “the empirical claim of a theory” and various “intertheoretical relations” (cf. 
Stegmüller (1979), Balzer, Moulines, Sneed (1987), Balzer and Moulines (1996)) that, 
according to Stegmüller, could be employed “to make rationally intelligible those histo-
rico-sociological aspects of scientific change that Kuhn had placed into the foreground”.  
To give the reader a taste of what the structuralist “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn was 
all about let us briefly recall its most important concepts. For reasons of space and time, 
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we have to assume some basic knowledge of the structuralist vocabulary. Thus we as-
sume to be known what is to be understood by a structuralist “theory element” T = <K, 
I> = <<Mp, Mpp, M, C>, I> (see for instance Stegmüller (1979, D4) or elsewhere). A 
theory-element is the smallest meaningful unit of the structuralist philosophy of science, 
intuitively, it may be considered as a kind of mini-theory consisting of a “theoretical 
core” K and a “domain of intended applications” I. Theory-elements are used to 
construe more complex structures such as theory-nets. After these preparatory remarks 
we can embark on the task of rationally reconstructing Kuhn via the following series of 
definitions: 
  
(3.1) Definition. X is a pragmatically enriched theory-element iff there exist T, SC, h, 
and F such that  
 
1) X = <T, SC, h, F>; 
2) T is a theory-element; 
3) SC is a scientific community; 
4) h is an historical interval; 
5) F ⊆ I.♦ 
 
Remark. The concepts SC of a scientific community and h of a historical interval are 
taken as primitive. Apparently SC is to be understood as a set of scientists, and h a tem-
poral interval in the usual sense. This may sound rather trivial, but at least it allows us to 
express assertions such as “SC1 is a part of the community of SC2”, or “the historical 
interval h1 comprises the historical interval h2” in the set-theoretical jargon of structura-
lism. As has been mentioned already above, “real theories” are more complex structures 
than theory-elements. The following definition is to make this idea precise. 
  
(3.2) Definition. X = <|N|, ≤ > is a pragmatically enriched theory-net (p.e net) iff 
 
1) |N| is a finite set of pragmatically enriched theory-elements; 
2) ∀ <T, SC, h, F>, <T’, SC’, h’, F’> ∈ |N| (SC = SC’ and h = h’) 
3) ≤ ⊆ |N| × |N|; 
4) ∀ <T, SC, h, F> ≤ <T’, SC’, h’, F’> ⇔ T is a specialization of T’.   
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The elements of F are those intended applications that are acknowledged by all 
members of SC, they are called firm applications.♦ 
 
Remark. A “specialization” is a so-called “intertheoretic relation” between theory-ele-
ments. A theory-element T’ = <K’, I’> is a specialization of T = <K, I> iff the 
components of T’ are subsets of the corresponding components of T. The intuitive idea 
is that T’ is more special than T, or, that T is more general than T’. 
 
(3.3) Definition. Let N, N* be two different theory-nets. N is supplantable incommen-
surably by N* iff there is a relation s ⊆ Mp* × Mp and spp ⊆ Mpp* × Mpp  and a non-
empty set Ia such that: 
 
(1) s is not effectively calculable. 
(2) spp is a function, is effectively calculable and spp(M*pp) = Mpp. 
(3) There do not exist n non-empty sets M1*, …, Mn* ⊆ M0* such that  
s(M1*), …, s(Mn *) ⊆ M0. 
(4) (i)    Ia ⊆ I0 ∩ rpp(I0*).     
(ii) for each y ∈ Ia (y ∈ r(M0*) and y ∉ r(M0)).♦ 
 
Remark. Considering N and N* as rational reconstructions of theories T and T* in an 
informal sense, the intention of (3.3) is to give a formally precise explication Kuhn’s 
notion of incommensurability: there is a “translation” spp between the data (applications) 
of T and T*, but this translation cannot be extended to a translation between the full 
conceptual kernels of T and T*.   
 
(3.4) Definition. Let H be a non-empty finite set and < ⊆ H × H. Then 
(1) <H, < > is an historical order iff for all x, y, z ∈ H: ¬x < x; x < y and y < z  
→ x < y; x < z or y < x. 
(2) If <H, < > is an historical order then  
(2)1 min(H) := the unique h ∈ H such that for all y ∈ H(h < y or h = y). 
(2)2 for h ∈ H, h ≠ min(H), h – 1 := the unique h’∈ H such that h’ < h  
and ¬∃x ∈ H (h’ < x and x < h) 
(3) If X is a p.e. net then h(X) := the unique h such that  
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∀ <T, SC, h’, F> ∈ |N|(h’ = h) 
(4) If X is a p.e. net then  
 (4)1 SC(X) := the unique SC such that ∀<T, SC, h’, F> ∈ |N|(SC’ = SC); 
 (4)2 F(X) := ∪{F; ∀T, SC, h(<T, SC, h, F> ∈ |N|)}; 
 (4)3 A(X) := ∪{I-F; ∀K, SC, h(<<K, I>, SC, h, F> ∈ |N|)}; 
(4)4 If N is a set of p.e. nets then H(N) := {h(X); X ∈  N}.♦ 
 
(3.5) Definition. E is a theory-evolution iff there exist N, < such that  
(1)  E = (N, <);  
(2) N is a finite net of p.e. nets; 
(3) <H(N), < > is an historical order; 
(4) ∀ X ∈ N ∀<T, SC, h, F> ∈ |N|) [h ≠ min(H(N))→∃ X’ ∈ N (h(X’) = h -1,  
∃ <T’, SC’, h’, F’ > ∈ |N’|, whereby T is a specialization of T’].♦ 
 
Remark. The concept of a theory-evolution may be characterized as a third-order 
concept in the hierarchy of structuralist concepts: on the first level there are theory-
elements, on the second nets of theory-elements, and on the third nets of nets of theory-
elements. The concept of theory-evolution intends to capture the development of theo-
ries over time. 
 
(3.6) Definition. If E = <N, < > is a theory-evolution then X is a paradigm for E iff there 
exist K0, I0, such that  
 
1) X = < K0, I0> is a theory-element; 
2) ∀ Y ∈ N ∀<K, I, SC, h, F> ∈  |N| such that 
 (2)1 K is a core specialization of K0; 
(2)2 ∀ x ∈ I ∃ y ∈ I0 (y ⊆ x and SC acknowledges y to be a paradigm subset of 
x.  
NB: |N| is the first member of Y.♦ 
 
And at long last we finally arrive at the crowning achievement of the structuralist 
“rational reconstruction” of the key concept of Kuhn’s philosophical legacy, to wit, a 
“Kuhnian theory-evolution”: 
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(3.7) Definition. E is a Kuhnian theory-evolution iff 
1) E is a theory-evolution; 
2) ∃ < K0, I0> (< K0, I0> is a paradigm for E). ♦ 
 
If we understand the structuralists’s intentions correctly they interpret Kuhn as con-
tending that the history of science may be described in terms of “Kuhnian theory-
evolutions”. A “set-theoretical reconstruction” or “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s 
thesis is accomplished by definition (3.7). This is the structuralists’s appropriation of 
Kuhn’s legacy.   
So what, the innocent reader may ask. Do we get a better philosophical understanding of 
what is conceptual change in the sense of Kuhn? Do we gain new insights in the 
conceptual subtleties of the various versions of the concept of incommensurability so 
many philosophers of science have struggled with? The structuralist philosopher of 
science Werner Diederich, after having presented a battery of similar definitions in his 
contribution to the anthology Structuralist Theory of Science. Focal Issues, New Results 
(Balzer and Moulines 1996) admitted: 
 
A suspicious reader might have gotten the impression that all these pragmatic and 
diachronic notions are somewhat sterile. In fact there are only very few theorems 
which have been derived from these definitions. However, the main spin-off should 
not be seen in an elaborated metatheory of the development of science, but in 
concrete reconstructions, which become possible by applying the structuralistically 
sharpened tools to actual scientific episodes. Such reconstructions have 
successfully been carried out by Moulines for classical particle mechanics and 
simple equilibrium thermodynamics. (Diederich 1996, 80).  
 
We doubt that the application of the “structuralistically sharpened tools to actual scienti-
fic episodes” have persuaded many readers. Rather, we are inclined to invoke Aris-
totle’s observation in Nicomachian Ethics: 
 
It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just 
as so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently foolish to accept 
probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician 
scientific proofs. (Aristotle 1940, Nicomachian Ethics, Book I.3). 
 
Others may object that falling back on Aristotle’s wisdom betrays too strong an 
adherence to informal common-sensical categories. A modern mind should trust in the 
wonders of modern scientific reconceptualizations. After all, the achievements of 
modern science go well beyond anything that Aristotle could have imagined even in his 
boldest dreams. Hence, in order to assess the chances of the structuralist reconstruction 
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of Kuhn’s historicist philosophy of science it may be more appropriate to rely on more 
scientific criteria than Aristotelian common sense. Taking into account the issue we are 
dealing with, it might be expedient to rely on some recommendations of Carnap 
himself: 
 
The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms … will be finally decided 
by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount 
and complexity of the efforts required. … Let us learn from the lessons of history. 
Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigation the freedom to 
use any form of expression which seems useful to them; the work in the field will 
sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful 
function. (Carnap 1950, 221). 
 
At the end of the day, for Carnap, as well as for Kuhn, a language form, a theory, or a 
paradigm, was an instrument for solving problems. In his reply to Strawson Carnap 
quite clearly expressed this instrumentalist stance as follows:   
 
A natural language is like a crude, primitive pocket-knife, very useful for a 
hundred different purposes. But for certain special purposes, special tools are more 
efficient, e.g., chisels, cutting-machines, and finally the microtome. ... Would 
anyone criticize the bacteriologist for using a microtome, and assert that he is 
evading the problem of correctly using a pocket-knife? 
 
The choice of a method for the solution of a given philosophical problem should be 
decided in each case by practical considerations. (Carnap 1963, 938, 939). 
 
For the sake of the argument let us grant Carnap this „pragmatist“ conception of philo-
sophical problems and let us agree with him, against Strawson, that there is no reason 
why for the solution of philosophical problems one has to rely on the resources of 
ordinary language. Even then someone who tried to use a microtome for slicing bread 
would be considered as a bit strange, to put it mildly. 
  
 
4. Neokantianism.   
In this section we want to discuss Michael Friedman’s attempt to apply some of  the 
ideas of Structure and related work (“the best current historiography of science” 
according to Friedman) to the task of formulating a  comprehensive account of philoso-
phy of science which describes the dynamics of (scientific) reason in an exact manner 
and, at the same time, does justice to its social and historical complexities. We propose 
to call Friedman’s approach “Neokantianism”. This may not be the most accurate name, 
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clearly “Neoneokantianism” would be more appropriate, but  certainly this would be a 
rather ugly name,  so we stick to to “Neokantianism”.   
Friedman has presented his approach in a variety of publications, in particular in his 
1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University Dynamics of Reason (Friedman 2001), but 
also in papers such as (Friedman 2002, 2003) and elsewhere. In this paper we cannot 
offer a comprehensive survey of his “Neokantian” approach, rather, we will concentrate 
on that part of Friedman’s Neokantianism where the appropriation of Kuhnian ideas 
plays an important role.   
The starting point of Friedman’s appropriation of Kuhnian ideas is the thesis that 
Kuhn’s “paradigm” and Carnap’s “linguistic framework“ share important similarities 
(see section 2). Going beyond this general thesis Friedman contends that these 
similarities are best understood from a Kantian perspective in that both Kuhn’s 
paradigm and Carnap’s linguistic framework may be seen as contemporary versions of 
what in Kantian terms was called a constitutive a priori of scientific knowledge. In 
contrast to Kant’s a priori, however, the modern versions of the a priori are not 
apodictic and fixed but may change over time. In Kuhnian terms, a change of the a 
priori is just a scientific revolution, Carnap, in less dramatic terms, calls  it a change of 
language or a change of a linguistic framework. Thus Kuhn’s central distinction 
between revolutionary science and normal science has a close parallel in Carnap’s 
account. Just as for Kuhn, considerations that concern paradigmatic changes do not 
proceed in accordance with generally agreed upon rules as in normal science, for 
Carnap questions concerning which linguistic framework to adopt are external questions 
that cannot be answered by using the rules of standard logic but that require less than 
absolutely compelling “pragmatic” considerations about which Carnap had not much to 
say. 
Friedman proposes to use the Kuhn/Carnap distinction between two essentially different 
phases or periods in the ongoing process of the scientific enterprise as an argument 
against some current conceptions of how science and philosophy are related. First, he 
argues against Quine’s holism according to which philosophy is to be conceived as 
being on the same level as science itself: philosophy is just science concerned with very 
general issues; secondly, Friedman argues against Carnap’s proposal to conceive 
philosophy as a special science, namely Wissenschaftslogik dealing with the logical 
structure of the language of science (cf. Friedman 2001, 19). According to Friedman 
Kuhn’s description of the history of the empirical sciences as a series of longer periods 
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of “normal science” evidences that philosophy should neither be conceived as a branch 
of cognitive psychology, as Quine contended, nor as a branch of logic or mathematics, 
as Carnap maintained. The main reason that philosophy is not an “ordinary” science in 
Kuhn’s sense is that its history does not exhibit the Kuhnian pattern of paradigmatic 
normal periods interrupted by short revolutionary periods. The historical evolution of 
philosophy (and other humanities as well) lacks such relatively quiet paradigmatic 
periods:   
 
In philosophy the most we ever achieve is temporary consensus on which figures 
or doctrines set the philosophical agenda – for the moment, that is, and within a 
relatively circumscribed setting. (Friedman 2001, 20). 
  
This should, however, not be considered as a defect. Rather, the difference between 
science and philosophy is essential for the evolution of our scientific culture as a whole:  
 
Science, if it is to continue to progress through revolutions, […] needs a source of 
new ideas, alternative programs, and expanded possibilities that is not itself 
scientific in the same sense – that does not as do the sciences themselves, operate 
within a generally agree upon framework of taken for granted rules. For what is 
needed here is precisely the creation and stimulation of new frameworks or 
paradigms … capable of motivating and sustaining the revolutionary transition to a 
new first-level or scientific paradigm. (ibid., 23). 
 
In other words, Friedman reserves a place for philosophy in the unending struggle for 
coping with the incommensurability of subsequent paradigms. The task of philosophy is 
to provide conceptual tools for sustaining the communication between partisans of 
different paradigms, even if this communication does not meet strict standards of 
scientific reasoning. Long ago, already Russell had proposed a similar conception of 
philosophy as a kind of an  adventurous complement to science: 
 
Just as there are families in America who from the time of the Pilgrim Fathers 
onward had always migrated westward, toward the backwoods, because they did 
not like civilized life, so the philosopher has an adventurous disposition and likes 
to dwell in the region where there are still uncertainties. (Russell 1918(1994),  
281).  
 
As Nozick pointed out, philosophers too often have been concerned with the task of 
arguing that this and that must be a certain way, and they made it their business to close 
off possibilities (cf. Nozick 2002, 8). The new way of doing philosophy, as proposed by 
Russell, Nozick, and Friedman, emphasizes, on the contrary, that philosophy should 
open new conceptual possibilities that may be scientifically not accessible. Thereby, 
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philosophy and science make fundamentally distinct, yet mutually complementary 
contributions to the total ongoing dialectic of human knowledge. In line with these 
complementary roles of philosophy and science Friedman proposes a stratified system 
of knowledge that can be analyzed into three main strata or levels (cf. Friedman (2001, 
45- 46):  
 
(1)  First level: Concepts and principles of empirical natural science such as the 
Newtonian law of universal gravitation or Einstein’s equations for the gravitati-
onal field.   
(2) Second level: Constitutive a priori principles such as the basic principles of geo-
metry and mechanics. Kuhn calls these relativized a priori principles paradigms.  
(3) Third level: Philosophical meta-paradigms or meta-frameworks, that serve as 
sources for suggestions, guidance, and orientation when an old paradigm seems 
to be in need to be replaced by a new one.    
  
As Friedman points out, his approach bears close similarity with Cassirer’s Neokantian 
approach presented 100 years ago in his Substance and Function (Cassirer 1910(1953)) 
(cf. Friedman 2001, 65ff). We cannot go into the details of the affinity of Cassirer and 
Friedman here, but we’d like to direct the reader’s attention to the fact that there is a  
fundamental ambiguity in the term „neokantianism“. On the one hand, it is used for any 
philosophical current that has appropriated some more a less important part of Kant’s 
philosophy. On the other hand, „neokantianism“ may be understood in a narrower 
sense, referring to the Neokantianism that flourished in Germany at the end of the 19th 
and at the beginnings of the 20th century, in particular to the Southwest school of 
Windelband and Rickert, and the Marburg School whose most important member for 
analytical philosophy seems to be Cassirer. The point is that the Marburg school, and in 
particular Cassirer subscribed to a „genetic epistemology“ that conceived the evolution 
of scientific knowledge in much more continuous way (approved by Friedman) than 
Kuhn’s conception with its emphasis on scientific revolution would admit. 
Friedman wants to have both worlds: he wants to incorporate Kuhn’s neokantianism 
that subscribes to the paradigm as a modern form of a relativized a priori, and he wants 
to incorporate Cassirer’s neokantianism that endows a genetic epistemology of the 
Marburg brand of German Neokantianism. These two versions of neokantianism stand 
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in a certain opposition to each other which is most clearly evidenced by the following 
quotes: 
 
No single astronomical system, the Copernican as little as the Ptolemaic, can be 
taken as the expression of the „true“ order, but only the whole of these systems as 
they unfold continuously according to a definite connection. (Cassirer 1910(1953), 
322). 
 
On the other hand, one has Kuhn’s famous (or notorious) „world-change“-
announcements (cf. Horwich 1993, Hacking 1993): 
  
The very ease and rapidity with which astronomers saw new things when looking 
at old objects with old instruments may make us wish to say that, after 
Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world. (Kuhn 1962, 117) 
... 
At the very least, as a result of discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature 
differently. And in the absence of some recourse to that hypothetical fixed nature 
that he „saw differently“, the principle of economy will urge us to say that after 
discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world. (ibid., 118). 
  
In our opinion the „world change“ declarations clearly show that Kuhn’s rupturist 
model of the historical evolution of science is quite different from the rather continuous 
one that Cassirer endorsed, even if the later Kuhn mitigated some of his earlier more 
radical claims. Friedman attempts to play down these differences.  
  
  
5. Kuhn as Problem for History of Philosophy of Science.  
Conceiving history as an essential ingredient for a philosophical understanding of 
science points toward a thorough naturalization of philosophy of science. Philosophy of 
science no longer seeks to comprehend science starting from a basis of some pre-given a 
priori principles, rather it attempts to understand science from the ongoing historical 
evolution of scientific knowledge itself. This process of naturalization comprises, of 
course, not only the historical dimension, but also the sociological, the psychological 
and other ones. Thereby new empirical disciplines pop up such as history of science, 
psychology of science, sociology of science, and so on.  On the other hand, traditionally 
the emphasis on the importance of history of philosophy was a stronghold of continental 
philosophy, while the interest of analytical philosophy for history was less fully 
developed. Due to the influence of Kuhn’s work, this state of affairs has changed. This 
is evidenced, for instance, by the meanwhile well-developed history of the logical 
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empiricism of the Vienna Circle and similar currents that are usually pursued from an 
analytical perspective.  
Even if there is a rather general consensus among philosophers that history of 
philosophy should play a certain role for philosophy, it is far from clear what precisely 
this role will be. For instance, some contend that we have to know the history of 
philosophy (of science) so as not to avoid important alternatives to contemporary 
proposals. In the case of philosophy in general, some authors want to go further, 
claiming that philosophy is essentially an historicist endeavor. How far this attitude may 
be applicable also to history of philosophy of science, remains to be investigated. In line 
with a general naturalistic outlook on science and philosophy, some years ago 
Hardcastle and Richardson spoke of a „historicist turn“ in philosophy of science that 
might help to overcome the crisis that, according to them, plagues contemporary 
philosophy of science. With „historicist turn“  
 
We refer to a more recent development in which philosophers have begun to re-
cover the problems, solutions and motivations of earlier projects in the philosophy 
of science, paying attention to how the historical figures engaged in these projects 
understood them. ... Adapting what is perhaps the most famous sentence in the 
philosophy of science of the second half of the twentieth century, we can assert that 
the history of the philosophy of science is coming to be viewed as more than a 
repository for anecdote and chronology, and can, if we allow it, produce a decisive 
transformation in the philosophy of science we now possess. (Hardcastle and 
Richardson 2003, vii).  
 
To be explicit, the „most famous sentence in the philosophy of science of the second 
half of the 20th century“ let us recall Kuhn’s famous dictum once again:  
 
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could pro-
duce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we now are 
possessed. (Kuhn 1962, 1). 
 
Hardcastle and Richardson’s history-oriented way of doing philosophy of science may 
be interpreted as a kind of second-order appropriation of Kuhn’s philosophical legacy, 
not to science, but to philosophy of science. Moreover, they claim that philosophy of 
science urgently needs this new means. According to them, contemporary philosophy of 
science is entangled in a deep conceptual, almost existential crisis, and history of philo-
sophy of science might help overcome it. Indeed, they invite us to tap the spiritual 
sources of a quite specific period of the history of philosophy of science: 
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[I]t may well be time to return to the social spirit of philosophy of science of the 
1930. Perhaps that is our best philosophical venture in a world of anxious social 
and technological Maybes. (Hardcastle and Richardson 2003, xxvi). 
 
More generally, the historical way of doing philosophy of science helps us recover 
conceptual resources that we lost from sight. Not everything „logical positivist“ or 
everything „transcendental idealist“ belongs in the dustbin of history. We may use 
history of philosophy of science as a source for exploring hitherto undeveloped or 
underestimated conceptual possibilities. Friedman’s neokantianism is a good example. 
The historical way of doing philosophy of science might help overcome not only the 
wide-spread amnesia concerning matters historical but also the illusion that philosophy 
and its history can be neatly separated from each other.  
A negative example of this attittude is the logical empiricism of the 1960s that strictly 
separated philosophy and history of philosophy. We already dealt with Carnap and the 
other adherents of the „bipartite metatheory“. Another, even blunter example is 
provided by Reichenbach who in The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Reichenbach 1951) 
drew a sharp line between „scientific“ philosophy and history of philosophy: 
 
The comparison between the old and the new philosophy is a matter for the 
historian and will be of interest to all those who were brought up in the old 
philosophy and wish to understand the new one. Those who work in the new 
philosophy do not look back; their work would not profit from historical 
considerations. They are as unhistorical as Plato was, or Kant, because like those 
masters of a past period of philosophy they are only interested in the subject they 
are working on, not in its relations to previous times.  
... 
Scientific philosophy attempts to get away from historicism and to arrive by logical 
analysis at conclusions as precise, as elaborate, and as reliable as the results of the 
science of our time. (Reichenbach 1951, 325).   
 
Exactly this simplistic separation of the two fields hindered logical empiricism to res-
pond adequately to Kuhn’s challenge of finding a „role for history“ in philosophy of 
science. Although Carnap’s proposed division of labour was less blunt than 
Reichenbach’s open dismissal of history for „scientific philosophy“, the general public 
seems not to have clearly distinguished between the two accounts. 
Kuhn’s proposal of „a role for history“ emphatically was not meant as one for a 
peaceful coexistence on the basis of a mutually accepted separation of two different 
worlds. It was a great error of the logical empiricists that they thought that Kuhn’s 
account did not importantly disrupt their own (cf. Richardson 2007, 368). In some 
sense, this error is repeated by those „revisionists“ who overestimate the similarities 
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between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s accounts conceiving Kuhn’s paradigms more or less 
simply as informal versions of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks, or vice versa (cf. 
Earman (1993, 32), Richardson (2007, 356)). Other scholars in the revisionist camp who 
are eager to diminish the difference between Kuhn and logical empiricism rely on a 
different strategy: They emphasize similarities between Kuhn and the „not-so-logical“ 
logical empiricists such as Frank, Neurath or Zilsel. The most interesting case is Frank, 
since there was a direct relation between him and Kuhn. As Nemeth reports, Richard 
Butts, relying on Adolf Grünbaum as his witness, asserts that Kuhn got the essential 
idea of Structure from lectures of Frank coming (probably not quite seriously) to the 
astonishing conclusion:   
 
One of the fathers of scientific philosophy (i.e. Frank, (A.I. and T.M)) actually 
wrote Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Nemeth 2007, Footnote 11, 
298).  
 
These attempts of coming to terms with Kuhn, either by pointing at some similarities 
between Kuhn and Carnap, or, alternatively, by similarities between him and Frank, 
Neurath, or Zilsel, are less than compelling. The fact that none of the later logical 
empiricists was able to offer a convincing comprehensive account of the „true“ logical 
empiricism to the general public, must be considered as a sign of profound conceptual 
weakness and exhaustion. A philosophical movement can hardly afford that there is a 
profound gap between its public image and its allegedly quite different true essence 
known only to some selected few. As Richardson points out, exactly this happened to 
logical empiricism in the 1950s and 1960s: 
 
Logical empiricism looked from the outside like something rather different from 
how it looked on the inside, and at least some philosophers of science as well as 
most, if not all, historians of science were well on the outside of logical 
empiricism. (Richardson 2007, 364). 
 
In sum, the rise of the historicist account of philosophy of science and the corres-
ponding decline of logical empiricism after the publication of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions keeps on being a difficult problem for history of philosophy of science and 
therefore for philosophy of science as well. We are still far away from a reasonably 
complete understanding of Kuhn’s role in the history of philosophy of science of the 
20th century, to say nothing about an unanimous assessment of his achievements. 
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6. Concluding Remarks. 
Even if there is no unanimously agreed upon assessment on Kuhn’s legacy for 
philosophy of science, as the very minimum one may say that Kuhn played a pre-
eminent role in the endeavor of reminding philosophers of science (once again) of the 
indispensable role of history for understanding scientific rationality. As the many 
different attempts of appropriating Kuhn’s ideas show, it is far from clear, however, 
how this role for history is to be conceived. It may well be the case that this problem has 
no unique solution, and certainly the three proposals that have been discussed in this 
paper, will not be the last word on this issue. 
Carnap’s proposal of a clear-cut and neat division of labour between a logic of science 
on the one hand, and empirical disciplines dealing with science such as history, 
sociology, and psychology, was not much more than a formal trick to eschew the real 
problem. Some forty years ago when Structure appeared on the scene it clearly failed. 
Whether the project of a logical empiricist „bipartite metatheory“ that has been recently 
proposed (cf. Uebel 2009) will score better in the future, remains to be seen.   
The structuralists’s attempt of appropriating Kuhn’s philosophical ideas failed in a quite 
different vein. In contrast to the logical empiricists who plead for a peaceful coexistence 
and division of labour between logical and non-logical perspectives of science, their  
structuralists successors, trusting in the allegedly much greater expressive power and 
flexibility of their set-theoretical apparatus optimistically opted for a full-fledged „ratio-
nal reconstruction“ of Kuhn’s novel conceptual framework. As everybody knows, a 
rational reconstruction is nothing to which the predicates „true“ or „false“ are ap-
plicable. Rather, a rational reconstruction is assessed to be useful or not useful. Up to 
now, the verdict of philosophers, scientists, and historians of science about the use-
fulness of the structuralist reconstruction of Kuhn’s ideas has been not very positive. 
The structuralist reconstruction is considered as a superficial formalization of Kuhn’s 
informal concepts. No intelligibility is gained by translating concepts of ordinary lan-
guage into a set-theoretical formalism. Even if one admits that everything can be 
translated into a set-theoretical jargon, it is hard to see why it should be translated. 
Again, this is not a final verdict. But more than  thirty years have passed since 
Stegmüller first put forward his rational reconstruction of Kuhn, and apparently not 
much progress has been made.  
What about the Neokantian attempt? It has certainly more philosophical appeal than the 
arid set-theoretical constructions of the structuralists and is more sophisticated than the 
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naive proposal of a neat division of labour that the later logical empiricists brought 
forward. Nevertheless, it cannot be considered as a fully satisfying response. Although 
it clearly was a clever move to reformulate the problem of incommensurability, which 
has bewitched generations of Kuhn scholars, as the general task of philosophy to take 
care of communicative rationality (Habermas) or reasonableness (Toulmin 2001) this 
shift can be considered only as a first step, since up to now these concepts are far from 
well understood. Take for instance, Habermas’s characterization of communicative 
rationality that Friedman takes as his starting point:  
 
The concept of communicative rationality carries connotations that ultimately trace 
back to the central experience of the non-coercively uniting, consensus creating 
power of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their 
initially subjective points of view, and, thanks to the commonality of reasonably 
motivated convictions, assure themselves simultaneously of the unity of the 
objective world and the intersubjectivity of their context of life. (Habermas 
1981/1984, vol. I, 8, Friedman 2001, 54). 
 
Even on a charitable interpretation this description lacks clarity. Indeed, in his conside-
rations Friedman relies on a quite different concept of communicative rationality as a 
means for maintaining a minimum of conceptual continuity during a change of para-
digm:  
The mathematical exact sciences still serve as the very best exemplars we have of 
universal communicative rationality in spite of, and even because of, their 
profoundly revolutionary character. (Friedman 2001, 117, 118). 
 
We admit that these words are truly heart-warming  for all friends of the Enlightenment 
project. But one may well doubt whether they are in line with Habermas’s and Kuhn’s 
original ideas. Indeed, it was a characteristic feature of Kuhn’s philosophy of science 
that for it the mathematical character of the exact sciences was of no importance at all. 
One could read Structure without becoming aware that modern physics, in contrast to 
Aristotle’s, say, is a highly mathematized science. On the other hand, for Kant and the 
Neokantians mathematics was the backbone of scientificity. Hence, for Kant and the 
Neokantians it was quite natural to look for some kind of „continuity“ between two „in-
commensurable“ paradigms in the underlying mathematics, but not for Kuhn. 
Friedman’s notion of communicative rationality, closely related to mathematization, is 
obviously quite different from Habermas’s. In sum, for the time being, Friedman’s 
Neokantian philosophy of science can hardly claim to be a fully elaborated account free 
of any  internal conceptual problems. But this does not exclude that it may be the most 
promising appropriation of Kuhn’s philosophical legacy available today. 
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